

The INC discussions on the adequacy of commitments were not fully conclusive and it seemed unlikely that Parties would succeed at COP-1 in agreeing or adopting a protocol or other legal instrument with additional commitments for Annex I Parties. Efforts focused on the definition of a framework for the establishment of such a protocol or other legal instrument to strengthen the commitments of Annex I Parties under the Convention. This resulted in the "Berlin Mandate" decision. Under the Berlin Mandate, the COP concluded that the current commitments in Article 4.2(a) and (b) are not adequate and agreed "to begin a process to enable it to take appropriate action for the period beyond 2000"⁴. The Mandate specifies that this process will aim to elaborate policies and measures and to set quantified greenhouse gas limitation and reduction objectives within specified time-frames, such as 2005, 2010 and 2020. It also establishes the Ad Hoc Group on the Berlin Mandate (AGBM) to conduct the process, calling for this group to complete its work "as early as possible in 1997, with a view to adopting the results at the third session of the Conference of the Parties".

The AGBM has met three times so far, twice in 1995 and once in 1996. Discussions have focused on identifying key issues for the analysis and assessment of climate change policies and measures and on possible approaches to establish quantified emission limitation and reduction objectives (QELROs) for the period beyond 2000. Several approaches that had come up earlier in discussions were mentioned as options, such as the AOSIS protocol proposal; maintaining 1990 greenhouse gas emission levels indefinitely after 2000 for Annex I Parties; or aiming to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 5 to 10 per cent below 1990 levels by 2010 for Annex I Parties. A number of alternative approaches were also brought up, including cumulative, differentiated or collective objectives, as well as a system of emission budgets for set periods of time. Differentiated objectives would be based upon the different economic situations and national circumstances of Annex I Parties, taking into account criteria such as GDP per capita, emissions per capita or per unit of territory, the amount of sinks and net emissions per capita and per unit of territory, per capita energy consumption, or other such indicators.

Joint implementation. The Convention also called upon COP-1 to take decisions regarding criteria for joint implementation under the Convention. Joint implementation has been one of the most hotly debated issues in the international negotiations on the implementation of the Convention. The Convention does not explicitly define the concept, but one interpretation is that joint implementation would provide a mechanism that would allow Annex I Parties to receive credit towards their own emission objectives by reducing emissions or enhancing sinks in other countries. While in OECD countries it was often felt that joint implementation could offer a mechanism to contribute to meeting the requirements of the Convention through cost-effective measures that reduce emissions, increase investment and/or improve energy efficiency in countries where projects are located, many developing countries were opposed to or sceptical about the idea. Their main concern was that such a mechanism could induce developed countries to undertake insufficient mitigation action at the national level, or that the possibility to buy cheap offsets abroad could reduce incentives to fully exploit opportunities for technological innovation at home. Further concerns were that joint

4. UN Document FCCC/CP/1995/7/Add.1, Decision 1/CP.1, see Section 3 of this report.